Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 2

2022

Lessons Learned: Mark Van Der Weide
Matthew A. Lieber
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
Macroeconomics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Policy History, Theory,
and Methods Commons, and the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Lieber, Matthew A. (2022) "Lessons Learned: Mark Van Der Weide," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 4 : Iss.
2, 2036-2041.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss2/93

This Lessons Learned is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Mark Van Der Weide
By Matthew A. Lieber
With more than two decades of continuing service at the Federal Reserve Board, Mark Van Der
Weide brings a unique insider perspective on central bank policymaking before, during, and
after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), including the Fed’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
in 2020. From 1998 to 2009, Van Der Weide served in the Fed’s legal division. Detailed to the
Treasury Department in 2009, he helped draft the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Back at the Fed in 2010, Van Der Weide served for eight years in
the Division of Supervision and Regulation, where he was made deputy director, helping to implement the Dodd-Frank Act and the Basel III accord, among other policies. The Board of Governors appointed him general counsel in 2017. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview
with Mr. Van Der Weide in September 2020.
Act fast—and with overwhelming force—to stop bank runs and asset fire sales.
Financial leaders at the Federal Reserve and the US Department of the Treasury learned a
clear set of lessons from the crisis of 2007–09, according to Van Der Weide. As he put it:
Number one: act fast, don’t dilly dally. When you see a financial system heading toward the abyss, do something about it rapidly; don’t waste time trying to figure out
what the perfect solution is. Just start acting to quell the panic.
Second and related, you need to act with overwhelming force using your full arsenal
of tools.
[And third,] a prime directive in a time of financial instability is that the central bank
needs to stop runs and fire sales of assets. That’s the thing that can really collapse
your economy.
The emphasis on an immediate and forceful crisis response, Van Der Weide indicated, has
been internalized equally by both newcomers and the remaining veteran Fed staff who
served in 2007–08. He shared that he felt that Fed’s response in 2020 to the COVID-19 crisis
reflected operationalization of the lessons learned:
I would say at a high level that the Fed’s response to the COVID crisis of 2020 has been
good. We learned the lessons of 2008 quite well, lessons we talked about before—the
need to act fast, to act with power, to stop the runs, and to be creative in responding
to the unfolding events. We’ve used every tool that we had, and I think we’ve been
quite successful in preventing the financial markets from dislocating. [ . . . ] One of my
takeaways from the COVID event of 2020 is that at least for this particular financial
crisis, the government’s toolkit worked quite well.
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By contrast, in 2007–08, the Federal Reserve’s response to the crisis was more drawn out,
for several reasons. Market events occurred in at least three waves: with mortgage market
tremors in 2007, the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and spiking with the September
2008 respective collapse and near-collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG, which pushed the
financial system to the edge. Along the way, the Fed and the Treasury sought to contain the
damage and insulate the broader economy from the mounting financial problems, intervening in commercial paper and repo financing markets, and attempting to resolve failing institutions.
In hindsight, one can see that earlier interventions by the Fed and the Treasury could have
reduced the spread and damage of the financial crisis. The novel forms of the challenges
called for extraordinary actions that were hard for these institutions to take at all, let alone
rapidly and smoothly: to study precedents and craft interventions that would be feasible,
efficacious, and legal—and then to line up the pieces and roll them out.
A major difficulty for the Fed was that its supervisory authority did not extend to many of
the institutions where the problems were emerging. As Van Der Weide explained:
A lot of the most tumultuous events of the financial crisis of 2008 occurred outside
the banking system that [the Fed regulated]—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, AIG—all of these were companies that we did
not regulate and that we did not supervise; we did not have perfect visibility into
those organizations.
As a result, continued Van Der Weide,
. . . At many distress points in the crisis—Bear Stearns, for example, and AIG, for example—we got very little notice of the deep nature of the problems at those firms.
Days, not weeks, for Bear Stearns and AIG.
Another challenge Van Der Weide related was addressing markets that the Fed had not traditionally regulated. For example, with commercial paper markets freezing up in October
2008, Fed leaders recognized a clear and present danger to the financial system. They had to
respond, but they had a basic legal issue. Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act makes
clear that the Fed is to act as a liquidity provider and not a credit risk taker. This constraint
had just prevented the Fed from rescuing Lehman Brothers. Van Der Weide described his
due diligence to scrutinize the Fed’s emergency legal authorities in Section 13(3) which had
not been invoked since the 1930s:
I personally spent quite a bit of time in late 2007, early 2008, in the Federal Reserve
Board legal division’s library, poring through all the different precedents that we had
on 13(3). There weren’t a whole lot, but we became expert on that pretty quickly as
we saw the strains increasing.
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility, which Van Der Weide considers the riskiest of the
facilities the Fed did in 2007-08, successfully reintroduced liquidity to commercial paper
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markets, using a novel design and narrow eligibility to ensure that the Fed’s exposure was
adequately secured.
Under-regulated pre-crisis, the banking system is sounder today thanks to updated
capital and liquidity standards.
Addressing crisis prevention, Van Der Weide shared a basic takeaway from the 2007–09 crisis: “We had woefully underregulated the global banking system.” Before the GFC, the Fed
and other bank regulators in the United States, as well as central banks around the world,
had not regulated the banking system as strongly as they should have, he said. This was a
contributing factor to the GFC. The crisis revealed some particular vulnerabilities across the
banking system, Van Der Weide explained, namely that banks did not have enough capital
and that they had too much liquidity risk.
To rectify these flaws, US bank regulators engaged with their global counterparts at the Basel
Committee in Switzerland to harmonize domestic reforms. Like many of the world’s major
economies, and under the Fed’s direction, the US implemented the Basel III accord, which
significantly strengthened the capital requirements for banks and implemented new liquidity requirements. The Basel reforms have “made banks tremendously safer,” Van Der Weide
explained, noting that “the combination of much higher capital requirements and decently
strict liquidity requirements has left the global banking system and the US banking system a
lot stronger.” According to Van Der Weide, estimating conservatively, “we tripled the
strength of bank capital requirements versus pre-crisis.”
Regarding liquidity levels, there previously had been much more limited regulations. Indeed,
the 2008 crisis stemmed in large part from banks holding long-term mortgage securities that
they funded excessively with short-term liabilities. The Basel Committee’s standards require
banks reliant on short-term funding to hold very liquid assets on their balance sheets.
Crisis-borne capabilities and greater political support boosted the Fed’s 2020 crisis
response.
Empowered by new lessons and post-crisis tools, the Fed responded much more rapidly and
effectively to the pandemic crisis of March 2020. Van Der Weide considered the COVID-19
response “a validation of the strength of government’s toolkit to deal with crises.”
Within weeks, the Fed rolled out emergency lending programs that had taken a year to deploy in the GFC. Among others, updated versions of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF), the money market mutual fund facility, and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF) kept the short-term funding markets operating.
Having already built them once and having kept them on the shelf relatively fresh
over the last 12 years, we were able to launch all of our short-term funding market
facilities very quickly in 2020. We were at least able to announce them very quickly.
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In addition, the Fed was able to tweak the programs to expand their impact thanks to greater
congressional support for the interventions. Van Der Weide noted, “in the CARES Act that
they passed, they gave Treasury a very large sum of money to make investments in Fed emergency lending programs. So, they positively promoted the establishment of our programs.”
This contrasted greatly with 2008, when according to Van Der Weide, the relationship “was
a little more difficult and a little more hostile.”
The Fed’s crisis response in 2020 also saw even tighter coordination with the Treasury Department because the Dodd-Frank Act required Treasury to formally pre-approve any Fed
13(3) emergency lending facility. The Fed also did more facilities with Treasury funding in
2020 than it did in the GFC. The Treasury’s first-loss position supported the Fed’s risk taking
on these programs, which enabled them to be broader than they might have been without it.
For example, the Fed expanded the CPFF to include a wider set of assets. Overall, the speed
and scale of the Fed’s 2020 crisis response, in Van Der Weide’s view “was quite critical to
restoring confidence.”
There is more work to be done on the shadow banking system.
While generally emphasizing the increased soundness of the US banking system, Van Der
Weide recognized that regulators have done less work on monitoring and reforming the
shadow banking system. Its heterogeneity complicates efforts to establish and oversee the
sector in a single regulatory framework; there is still much to be done. He noted that, perhaps
partially as a result of post-GFC banking reforms, there had been some movement of activity
from regulated banks to shadow banks, highlighting the need for greater scrutiny.
Van Der Weide identified three trends in shadow banking activities that the Fed is monitoring:
Mortgage origination has moved significantly away from the banking system. You’ve
seen a significant decline in the size of the trading books of the big US banks and
movements of some of that trading activity into smaller proprietary trading firms,
hedge funds, and some other kinds of fund vehicles.
[...]
Leveraged lending is something [else] to keep an eye on. It was a business the banks
got burned on in 2008 . . . A lot more leveraged loans are being held on the balance
sheets of securitization vehicles like CLOs – collateralized loan obligations – and loan
mutual funds.
Still, he pointed to some key successes regarding shadow banking—tightening regulation of
derivatives markets, authorizing the Financial Stability Oversight Council to designate individual shadow banks that become systemic, and pushing for more disclosure. In addition,
Van Der Weide explained that the crisis revealed three particular vulnerabilities across the
financial system:
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In addition to banks not having enough capital and having way too much liquidity
risk, the other thing we learned—at the top of the lessons learned list—was, we didn’t
really have a very good failure framework to deal with large financial institutions.
He credits Title II of Dodd-Frank, specifically its Orderly Liquidation Authority, for establishing a process to resolve large nonbank financial institutions. Although the framework has
not yet been tested by a systemically important institution’s failure, it does give regulators a
powerful new tool that they did not have in 2008. Van Der Weide commented: “I think at
least on paper it looks like it's an effective way to allow the failure of the next Bear Stearns
that comes along.”
The Fed’s broader crisis-fighting role raises questions for its independence.
Of note during the GFC, the Fed maintained a close alignment with the Treasury Department,
which Van Der Weide said was its main liaison to the executive branch. The Fed had several
conversations with the Treasury before launching any of its 13(3) facilities. “We always got
the Treasury’s informal consent,” Van Der Weide explained, noting that, “We weren’t required to by law, but we felt that given the emergency nature of those programs, the potential
risk to the taxpayers, it was the right thing to do to get part of the elected branch of government onboard with the programs.”
The GFC and COVID-19 crises have seen the Fed deploy its authorities in novel and broader
ways, which according to Van Der Weide, presented certain new concerns for Fed independence that should be carefully watched:
The government has now acted quite powerfully two different times in the last 12
years to avert a financial crisis, and a lot of people worry about what the long-term
consequences might be of the central bank, of Congress, stepping in and intervening
very powerfully in the financial markets to prevent them from collapsing.
[...]
This is something that we don’t have time to think about in situations like September
2008 or March 2020, but which are very important public policy issues for us all to
keep in mind. There certainly are long-term risks of those sorts of interventions from
a central banking perspective. Obviously, when we have low interest rates and are
doing massive asset purchases, there are certainly risks of asset bubbles in financial
markets and potentially inflation. Now, the low interest rates from 2008 to 2020 did
not generate any scary asset bubbles or excessive inflation, in my view, but past is not
always prologue. And these are things we need to watch.
And then the last thing I wanted to flag is that we also need to be very careful about
potential threats to central bank independence as the Fed acts more frequently and
in broader ways to avert financial crises. The more that the central bank is relied upon
to solve non-traditional problems, the more the central bank is taking risks with taxpayer money, and the more that we’re viewed as allocating credit or picking winners

2040

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

and losers, the less independence that Congress and the executive branch will be willing to give the Fed. And independence is critically important to the success of a central
bank.
Dated: June 2022
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